Zohran Mamdani’s Father Wrote A Book Promoting The Myth of Blowback and Whitewashing Jihadist Terror
In his 2004 book Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, Mahmood Mamdani delivers a provocative thesis: that modern Islamist terrorism is not rooted in religious ideology, but is instead the byproduct of decades of U.S. foreign policy. He argues that Western powers—particularly the United States—nurtured and weaponized radical Islam during the Cold War, and that the violence of 9/11 should be understood as “blowback”: the violent, if tragic, consequence of American interventionism. This book is essential reading in many of the upper level classes addressing Cold War history, political Islam and cultural politics.
In this book, Mamdani criticizes what he calls the “culture talk” of the post-9/11 world, where Muslims are divided into binaries—“good” Muslims (peaceful, apolitical) and “bad” Muslims (violent, radical). He claims this binary serves imperial interests, dehumanizes Muslims, and ignores the West’s role in creating the very monsters it now fears. This central thesis is deeply flawed but more then that it is dangerously irresponsible.
By portraying terrorism as reactive rather than ideological, Mamdani erases the religious and doctrinal motivations behind jihadist violence. His framing not only distorts history but also offers moral cover to extremists, shifts blame from perpetrators to victims, and misleads policymakers and the public about the true nature of the threat.
While U.S. foreign policy has certainly shaped global dynamics, reducing jihadist terrorism to mere geopolitical retaliation is not only morally evasive, it also whitewashes the ideological roots of jihad and purposefully mischaracterizes the threat.
I. The Historical Roots of Jihad Precede U.S. Foreign Policy
Long before America was a superpower, violent interpretations of jihad had been codified by radical theologians.
Jihadist violence did not begin in the 1980s with the U.S. arming of Afghan mujahideen. The ideological foundation for militant Islam was laid centuries earlier:
In the 7th century, the Khawarij—the first violent Islamist sect—emerged, murdering fellow Muslims who they viewed as impure.
Ibn Taymiyyah (13th century) legitimized violence against Muslims deemed apostates.
Wahhabism (18th century) sought to purify Islam through the sword, launching violent campaigns across Arabia.
Sayyid Qutb (20th century), a key intellectual influence on al-Qaeda, called for jihad against secular governments and Western values, arguing that the modern world was in a state of “jahiliyya” (ignorance) and must be overthrown through violence.
These were not desperate responses to foreign invasion, they were proactive doctrines, rooted in religious absolutism and apocalyptic visions of Islamic rule. The ambitions of jihadist groups whether al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, or others, are not reactive, but messianic and expansionist.
These ideas became the spine of modern jihadist movements like al-Qaeda and ISIS. Their goal was never just to resist imperialism, it was to establish a global Islamic caliphate through religious war. That ambition existed independent of American foreign policy and existed long before the CIA ever stepped foot in Afghanistan.
Islamist terrorism is not just political—it is doctrinal. It’s not always about what the West does; it’s about what the extremists believe.
II. Terrorism as Ideological Mission, Not Reflexive Rage
Jihadist terrorism is not a scream of the oppressed. Instead, it is a calculated, religiously motivated strategy.
Al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. on 9/11 not because of Western injustice, but because it saw America as the principal obstacle to its caliphate dream.
ISIS didn’t rise from poverty or imperial grief—it rose from ideological clarity. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi didn’t cite Cold War geopolitics; he cited scripture and declared a caliphate based on seventh-century religious law.
These organizations target civilians intentionally, believe in divine reward for mass murder, and operate with a global vision of Islamic domination.
To suggest these groups are simply reacting to American policies is to miss the entire point of who they are and what they believe. This is not a movement of victims—it is a movement of true believers, who see murder as worship.
III. The Danger of Mamdani’s Blowback Thesis
In Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, Mamdani suggests that terrorism is a rational, if horrifying, consequence of U.S. Cold War policy—particularly the funding of Islamist fighters during the Soviet–Afghan war. He argues that America created the monster that turned against it.
This argument isn’t just wrong. It’s insanely dangerous for several reasons:
1. It Erases the Agency of Terrorists
Mamdani's narrative reduces jihadists to political instruments, not moral agents. In doing so, he shifts focus away from their choices and beliefs. The 9/11 hijackers were not brainwashed peasants, they were educated, middle-class men who made a conscious, ideological decision to kill thousands in the name of God. By framing 9/11 as "blowback," Mamdani subtly shifts responsibility from those who plotted mass murder to the country that was attacked. It moralizes terrorism as understandable and perhaps even inevitable, instead of condemning it as inexcusable evil.
2. It Misleads the Public About the Nature of the Threat
If terrorism is just a reaction to foreign policy, then the “solution” is to back off. But appeasement doesn’t disarm an apocalyptic movement. It emboldens it. Understanding the enemy requires facing its theology and mission head-on—not inventing excuses rooted in Western guilt. Mamdani’s view implies that jihadists are merely the byproducts of Western action. In reality, these are ideologically motivated actors, often well-educated, who choose violence not because they’re poor or oppressed, but because they believe it fulfills divine command.
Terrorists are not puppets. They are the puppet masters.
3. It Silences Reformers Within Islam
Muslim reformers across the world have openly acknowledged the ideological rot within parts of their religious tradition. From scholars to activists, many are risking their lives to fight extremist interpretations. Mamdani’s blowback thesis ignores these efforts and instead points the finger outward—absolving internal accountability.
4. It Rewrites the Moral Ledger
Framing 9/11 as blowback subtly suggests that America had it coming. This is not just offensive—it is morally inverted. The deliberate murder of 3,000 civilians is not a political message. It is an act of evil. To soften that fact is to dishonor the dead and disarm the living.
IV. Mamdani Got It Fatally Wrong
Mamdani is fatally wrong is in suggesting that terrorism is America’s creation, rather than an ancient ideological movement that has found new opportunity in a modern, interconnected world. Jihadist terror is not a Frankenstein we built—it’s a beast that existed long before us and will exist long after, unless confronted directly.
The attacks we’ve seen in the 21st century—the 9/11 attacks, the Bataclan massacre in Paris, the Sri Lanka Easter bombings, the Manchester Arena bombing, and countless others—were not spontaneous responses to Western actions. They were the executions of a violent, utopian fantasy rooted in extremist theology.
These acts are driven by belief systems that:
Divide the world into believers and infidels.
Justify the killing of innocents as divine obedience.
Promise eternal paradise for martyrs who die in the act of slaughter.
These attackers didn’t misinterpret Islam. They acted on a fringe but well-documented strain of it—a strain legitimized by centuries of hardline scholarship, radical clerics, and modern digital echo chambers. Their targets weren’t just soldiers. They were schoolchildren, concertgoers, church attendees or anyone who didn’t submit.
Conclusion: Clarity Over Cowardice
Islamist terrorism is not caused by America. It is fueled by an ideological machine that predates the U.S., transcends national boundaries, and exploits scripture to justify bloodshed. To suggest otherwise is to play into the hands of those who want their crimes viewed not as evil, but as resistance.
The longer we entertain the illusion that we are the cause of their hatred, the longer we blind ourselves to the truth: They kill not because of who we are, but because of who they believe they must become and what they believe we must be.